The Milbank Q uarterly, V ol. 6 5 , N o . 4 , 1987 
achieve o p e ra tin g efficiency. It is th is req u irem en t for management ch an ge th at w e ex am in e.
T h e p ro m in en ce th at D R G s have g a in e d in current health policy is p artially ex p lain ed by the sed u ctiv en ess econ om ic incentives hold for p o licy an aly sts. E co n o m ic lo g ic ap p e als to com m on sense and its p rescrip tio n s ap p e ar to be self-ex ecu tin g : chan ge the financial rewards an d beh avior ch an ges. E con om ic theory, how ever, is neither the only nor perhaps the best gu id e to understand hospital behavior. An alternative perspective, that o f organization theory, describes hospitals as complex, p ro fessio n -d o m in ated in stitu tio n s w ith m u ltip le objectives and wellestablished routines (Perrow 1965) . Such an institution can be expeaed to resist extern ally im p o sed p ressu re to chan ge in directions that th reaten preferred values an d relatio n sh ips. 
DRG Management
F etter and T h o m p so n con ceived the D R G m eth od when they sought to ap p ly the tech n iq u es o f in d u strial m an agem e n t. F etter's disciplinary sp e cia liza tio n , to h o sp itals. In itia lly , they w ished to understand the w ays in w hich h o sp ital in p u ts-tech n olo gy , su p p lies, facilities, and s ta ff-are lin k ed to h o sp ital o u tp u ts. T h is led them to attem pt to define the o u tp u ts o f h o sp itals th ro u g h a review o f m edical records an d ev en tu ally to the creation o f 4 6 7 classes o f patien ts or, as they cam e to be kn ow n , d ia g n o sis-re la te d g ro u p s (T h o m p son , Fetter, and M ross 1 9 7 5 ). C arefu l a cco u n tin g o f the m in im u m resources needed to p rod u ce efficacious care for each D R G w^ould, they thought, set the stan d ard for the cost-effective p ro d u ctio n o f hospital outputs.
F etter an d T h o m p so n believed th at n on profit org an izatio n s, including h o sp ita ls, served so ciety b est by b e co m in g efficien t. W hen they found little in terest a m o n g h o sp itals in u tiliz in g th eir cost-accountin g and m an agem ent-con trol sy stem for im p ro v in g efficiency, the Y a le in ves tigators resh aped the D R G con cep t in to a reim b u rsem en t sy stem (Fetter, T h o m p so n , an d M ills 1 9 7 6 ). T h e ex p ectatio n w as th at if hospitals were p a id a fixed p rice for each D R G , they w ould have to become efficient or be forced in to d eficit.
T h u s, the D R G sch em e ex p an d ed an in tern al c o st-acco u n tin g c la s sification in to a fu ll-scale p ro g ra m for e v a lu a tin g and c h an g in g h o sp ital behavior. D R G s w ere the bench m a rk s, the u n its o f h o sp ital activ ity to which m ean in gfu l p ro d u ctio n co sts cou ld be attach ed (F ette r an d U n til reim b u rsem en t u n certain ties exceed those o f clinical practice, the pow er balan ce w ith in h o sp itals w ill not sh ift. H osp ital income is u n lik ely to be so con strain ed by reim b u rsem en t policies, DRG-based or oth erw ise. W h ile concerns for cost control are widespread, there is no support for threatening the financial viability o f hospitals. Society's d esire to con tro l h o sp ital costs is coun terbalanced by its desire to im p ro ve the access to an d the q u a lity o f h ospital care.
In p ractice , a d m in istra to rs have a w ide range o f actions available to th em to cope w ith rate p ressu res before they have to confront the sen sitiv e relatio n sh ip w ith p h ysician s (C ook et al. 1983 ). These include per year to pay for u n co m p en sated care (N e w Je rse y S tate D e p a rtm e n t of H ealth 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 2 ). B y the th ird year o f th e new sy ste m , innercity hospitals were g e n e ra tin g la rg er financial su rp lu se s th an th eir suburban cou n terparts (figure 1).
Except for those a n tic ip a tin g a w in d fall. N e w Je rse y h o sp itals w ere initially reluctant to m ove to D R G re im b u rsem en t. T h ey feared the changes in the rou tin es for m a n a g in g h o sp ital resources th at D R G advocates so u g h t. Before they w o u ld cooperate w ith the state in the implementation o f the D R G system , the hospitals lobbied for concessions (Morone and D unham 1985) . T hese included changes in the m ethodology for calculatin g the D R G rates, in the p ercen tag es o f the rates to be o f the con cession s in la ter n e g o tiatio n s (S ap olsk y , A isenberg, and M oron e 1 9 8 7 ).
In a d d itio n , the h o sp ita ls had the p ro tectio n o f an appeals mechanism w ith in the recon ciliatio n p rocess. R eim b u rse m e n ts are not final until h o sp ita ls ex h au st ap p e als to th e sta te rate-settin g com m ission and co m p le te an an n u al recon ciliatio n w ith the state on the specifics of reim bursem ent. T h is process delays the determ ination o f final operating resu lts for u p w ard o f tw o years. M o st h o sp ita ls, than ks to good legal an d acco u n tin g ad v ice, m an ag e to g a in sig n ifican t addition al payments an d av oid d eficits w hen they receive th eir final reim bursem ent totals.
Strategies for Expanding Revenues
A s productive as political strategies proved to be for protecting hospitals from the rig o rs o f re g u latio n . N e w Je rse y ad m in istrato rs still worried about the potential effects of D RGs when the system was being put in place. Quite understandably, many hospitals sought to increase revenues by expanding the volume of admissions. By bringing in more patients, it would not be necessary to make painful choices about reductions in hospital capacity. Past research suggested that the un certainties of medical judgment provided management with sufficient opportunities to influence admissions policies (Wennberg and Gittlesohn 1982) . In the period from 1979 to 1984, New Jersey hospitals increased admissions per capita by more than 6 percent while admissions were declining 5 percent nationally (American Hospital Association 1972 -1985a .
Most hospitals turned to traditional ways to expand admissions. A prime technique was by recruiting more physicians. St. Michael's in Newark, for example, urged its graduating residents to join the attending staff (Pena, Jamison, and Rosen 1986) . Others, such as St. Joseph's in Paterson, started new programs in open-heart surgery or oncology, and brought in out-of-state specialists to staff them. Hospitals also expanded high-visibility technology such as computerized tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners, adding greatly to their capital investment in the years since DRGs were introduced. In addition, hospitals experimented with programs in industrial med icine, satellite facilities, and preferred provider arrangements, all with the goal of increasing the patient base available to hospitals. There were even direct-marketing efforts including television and newspaper advertising and the distribution of hospital magazines and newsletters. A particular target was the use of Philadelphia and New York City hospitals by New Jersey residents (Courtney 1986 ).
Yet another strategy hospitals rely on to expand revenues is to assure that the highest applicable diagnosis is reported. In its most flagrant form, known as " D RG creep," a hospital attempts to shift systematically its reported case mix in order to improve reimbursement (Simbourg 1981) . In interviews with hospital administrators, we dis covered that the deliberate reordering of diagnoses into the most profitable categories was not generally needed. Hospitals enhanced their revenues simply by documenting complications and, in cases with imprecise diagnostic boundaries, by labeling the diagnosis with the highest level of payment as the principal diagnosis. The revenue gains from more careful record keeping were sufficient that physicians did not have to become very knowledgeable about choosing diagnoses in order to increase hospital payments.
We examined hospital attempts to manage diagnostic information through an analysis of changes in hospital case mix reported during the period of 1981 to 1984. A comparison of 12 pairs of high-volume DRGs (table 1)-the simple diagnosis and the same diagnosis with complications-^provides evidence of how hospitals gain revenue through complete documentation. For each pair, there was a dramatic shift in the volume of cases from the simple diagnosis to the higher-priced classification, which adjusts for complications, comorbidities, and an age factor. We also relied on a weighted average index of hospital discharges, with each discharge weighted by its DRG price to measure case-mix intensity (New Jersey State Department of Health 1981 Health -1984 . The aggregate case-mix index expanded by 3.7 percent from 1981 to 1983. In this period, the estimated revenue gain due to reported changes in case mix was $38.7 million, or roughly $380,000 per hospital. Although some of the reported increase in the severity of case mix may result from an aging population and the substitution of outpatient for inpatient services, it can be presumed that a large portion is due to more sophisticated coding practices. The greater emphasis on record keeping is reflected in a more than 20 percent increase in total man hours for that purpose reported by New Jersey hospitals between 1979 and 1983 (New Jersey State Department of Health 1979 Health , 1983 .
Cost Control within the Hospital
We believe hospital administrators prefer management strategies that are designed to enhance revenues over cost-control measures that may be resisted by members of their staff. They institute cost-saving pro cedures only when they have exhausted other possibilities for revenue growth. Some New Jersey hospitals were successfiil enough in expanding their revenue base that they avoided difficult cost-cutting decisions altogether. Others had to become sophisticated in cutting back on operating costs in order to stay within the financial limits imposed by DRGs. Clinical services-although not immune to scrutiny-^were usually accorded the highest priority and, therefore, were the last to be pared. Adult sim ple pneum onias 8 9 * 8 ,4 2 6 3 6 .4 % 9 0 3 ,2 8 4 0 .9 Adult bronchitis and 9 6 * 5 ,7 6 0 4 6 . N EW JERSEY 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 NORTHEAST*** 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 UNITED STATES 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 , 1972-1985. An evaluation of the first five years' experience showed that the New Jersey D RG system was about as effective in controlling overall hospital inflation as was the previous SHARE regulation (table 2). Although there was no significant decrease in the growth of hospital expense per capita after 1980 when the D RG system replaced SHARE, the New Jersey rate did remain slightly below national and regional levels (Hsiao and Dunn 1987) . New Jersey hospitals did slow the growth in the costs per admission. When adjusted for inflation, expenses per admission were maintained at relatively constant levels during the period of 1980 to 1984. New Jersey hospitals constrained per case expenses more effectively than their counterparts in either the Northeast region or the United States as a whole.
To identify the kinds of changes instituted by hospitals, we examined (table 3) . The most significant change that occurred was about a 4 percent decrease in routine-care costs when adjusted for inflation. Routine care, accounting for more than half of total expenses per case, includes nursing, dietary, laundry, and other operating costs. Given that some of these costs are fixed, the decrease in routine-care expenditures was not only due to hospital efficiencies, but also to increased admissions that spread the costs over more cases.
Some analysts predicted that DRGs would force hospitals to cut back on nursing staff, one of the largest components of routine-care costs (Lohr et al. 1985) . But New Jersey hospitals did not reduce nursing staff or shift to less expensive nurses. Nursing hours per patient day in New Jersey increased by 15 percent over the period of 1979 to 1984, which was roughly comparable to regional and national trends (New Jersey State Department of Health 1979 Health , 1984 . In addition, registered nurses, who earn considerably higher salaries than licensed practical nurses, now comprise a larger share of nursing staff than in 1979, also reflecting national trends. Because the New Jersey payment system was not very constraining, most hospitals did not confront difficult decisions about reducing their staff.
Hospitals sought other, more administratively feasible, procedures for lowering routine-care costs that would not undermine staff morale. Perhaps the single most important method was to decrease the average length of stay. It dropped by more than 10 percent from 1981 to * * Hospital financial groups are measured by a hospital's average operating surplus three years prior to D R G payment. The ranges of average surplus are: profit hospitals, + 1.5 percent and above; break-even, -1.0 to + 1 .5 percent; and deficit, less than -1.0 percent. * * * F-statistic for testing the hypothesis that group mean length of stay changes, 1979 to 1984, for different financial groups are equal. F-value is significant at the 0.10 level. Source: American Hospital Association 1972 -1985a 1984, which translated into lower costs per case for routine services. (Hospitals could obtain considerable savings by shortening hospital stays, even though the marginal cost per day does tend to decline over the course of a hospitalization.) Our data suggest that hospital administrators responded more to the overall financial pressure of prospective payment by reducing the length of stay generally than to the incentives linked to specific DRGs. Hospitals earning a comfortable financial surplus decreased their length of stay by 8 percent from 1979 to 1984, compared to nearly 12 percent for break-even hospitals and 14 percent for deficit hospitals (table 4) . In contrast, we found little evidence that administrators systematically targeted their length of stay efforts to money-losing DRGs. Nor did they single out either surgical or medical D RG s in their efforts to control hospital days; length of stay declined in both categories (New Jersey State Department of Health 1981 Health -1984 . Interestingly, the length of stay was even reduced among outlier cases when it was contrary to the financial interests of the hospital, evidence again of systemic rather than focused control efforts. DRG reformers believed that hospital administrators would not only decrease the routine costs of operating a hospital, but that they would also try to eliminate costly medical practices that were of marginal value (Broyles and Rosko 1986) . Ancillary services were seen as a potential target for cost containment, as some observers noted that a substantial portion of their utilization was of little therapeutic benefit (Hubbell et al. 1985; Stoughton 1982) . Hospitals, it was predicted, would begin monitoring individual physicians' use of X rays, laboratory tests, and other services. If a physician's resource use were to exceed the norm, without adequate medical justification, he would be encouraged to cut back his orders for ancillary services.
Nevertheless, in our data we found few examples of hospitals that attempted to monitor ancillary use as a means of controlling costs. In fact, the total constant dollar costs per case of ancillary services among New Jersey's hospitals increased by about 3 percent from 1981 to 1984. Expenditures for drugs expanded by about 6 percent over this period. (The trend in ancillary costs per case in the period of 1981 to 1984 did drop slightly from the two preceding years. The increase in costs for services outside the hospital and the drop in length of stay may account for part of this. The data show that cost pressures, though, were clearly most focused on routine care.) The growth in ancillary costs further demonstrates the reluctance of most hospital administrators to attempt to modify clinical as opposed to routine services. Financial constraints on ancillary services are not imposed because they directly threaten the physician's role as the manager of care provided to the individual patient.
To examine whether hospitals would diminish their reliance on costly high technology, we analyzed changes in the costs of care provided in the intensive-care unit (coronary care units were included in this category). Intensive-care units are considered by many to be the "hallmark" of the modern hospital, combining sophisticated mon itoring and state-of-the-art therapies (Knaus and Thibault 1982) . Research suggests that certain patients incur high costs in the intensivecare unit, but derive no measurable benefit from the services provided (Cullen et al. 1976) . Some commentators believe that DRGs provide hospitals with a dictate that they must evaluate the cost effectiveness of intensive care and eliminate any unnecessary utilization (Coulton et al. 1985; Butler, Bone, and Field 1985; Lohr et al. 1985) . When this cost center was scrutinized, however, we detected no specific DRG effects. After accounting for inflation, the intensive-care costs per case rose over 11 percent from 1981 to 1984 (New Jersey State Department of Health 1981 Health , 1984 . Nor did the number of intensivecare unit days per case decrease (.46 days per case in 1981 compared with .49 days in 1984). These data are consistent with the notion that hospitals will attempt to protect their technical core from the effects of rate regulation (Cook et al. 1983 ).
Mechanisms for Reducing Length of Stay
Our data show that by far the most widespread change in New Jersey hospitals was a reduction in the length of stay. Because the state's per diem rate-setting system that was in effect between 1975 and 1979 had encouraged longer stays, hospitals only began to decrease length of stay in 1980 when the D RG reforms were adopted. Hospitals elsewhere started to decrease length of stay at an earlier period (American Hospital Association 1 9 7 2 -1985b). By 1980 the technical conditions thus existed for New Jersey to reduce substantially hospital stays.
Hospital administrators have long used patient days as a measure for the consumption of nonclinical or hotel-type resources. In contrast, physicians consider the marginal hospital day to be without much clinical relevance. Because of these differing perspectives, physicians have been willing to allow administrators influence over length of stay in ways that would not be acceptable in other areas of their responsibility. Directives from administrators about the core of clinical practice-the detailed treatment regimens for patients-^would not be accepted by physicians. Exhortations for physicians to help fill or vacate hospital beds, however, are viewed as legitimate.
In our interviews, we discovered that hospitals used many different methods to foster shorter stays. Patients often remain in hospitals because they have no place to go. Under a per diem system a hospital has a financial impetus to hold onto its patients in order to gain larger reimbursements. Under a per case system, administrators have a clear financial incentive to transfer patients out of the hospital as quickly as possible. New Jersey hospitals, therefore, expanded their discharge planning efforts. More social workers now evaluate elderly or sicker patients at an earlier stage, so that an appropriate nursing-home placement can be found. Links of all kinds to nursing homes have been strengthened; some hospitals have even purchased nursing homes. Similar ties to home care agencies have been formed, and hospitalmanaged home care is growing. The potential effects of discharge planning are limited, however, by the relatively small percentage of patients who are institutionalized or receive home care following hos pitalization (Meiners and Coffey 1985) . In order to cut the average length of stay by a significant amount, hospitals must frequently turn to strategies that affect larger numbers of patients.
At the same time that the reimbursement system in New Jersey was being established, the states professional review organizations (PROs) were strengthened and reorganized. (This took place three years before changes in the national system.) They scrutinized most admissions against specific length-of-stay norms. Nurse evaluators, backed by physician advisory committees, made frequent phone calls to high utilizers, asking for justification of patient stays. Although their ultimate sanction-to deny payment for added days-was rarely used, they caused considerable physician consciousness on this issue.
PROs achieved this result in New Jersey because they were usually structured as county-wide agencies, no longer under direct hospital control. In some hospitals the PRO norms were notably inconsistent with the average length of stay for particular DRGs, and physicians complained about the conflicting standards. Some administrators found the situation convenient, as it allowed them to blame the federal government for the pressures on hospital use.
Reductions in length of stay were also the result of national changes in medical practice that affected specific DRGs (Sloan and Valvona 1986) . Like health facilities in the nation as a whole. New Jersey hospitals encouraged more preadmission testing prior to hospitalization, which in turn stimulated the growth of outpatient diagnostic services. Other diagnostic tests are being clustered on the first or second hospital day, instead of sequentially. Administrators have also expanded sameday surgery facilities. Between 1981 and 1983, the volume of sameday surgery grew by 70 percent among the largest 30 DRGs where there is a same-day surgery option (New Jersey State Department of Health 1981 Health -1984 .
Although our interviews and our data base show little sustained administrator pressure on the details of medical treatment, we found that length of stay is subject to administrative influences. Many hospitals found that the length of stay for high-volume DRGs (e.g., uncomplicated delivery, uncomplicated myocardial infarction) was the most reliable and understandable number in D RG profiles. By monitoring these D RG profiles, hospital administrators could suggest length-of-stay norms and encourage physicians to comply with them. But small length-of-stay reductions do not seriously threaten professional pre rogatives, and hospital sensitivity to length of stay affects social workers and lab schedules more than physicians. Discharging the patient a day or two earlier is consistent with a long-standing national trend, and far different from altering the physicians' detailed treatment patterns.
New Jersey hospitals increasingly found that it was useful to create or expand the position of chief of the medical staff to interpret their concerns about length of stay to attending physicians in a legitimate professional manner. The newly appointed chiefs were often local practitioners, in semiretirement from clinical practice. They would usually be given the task of reviewing the length-of-stay profiles with some of the high utilizers, but follow-up was erratic. The inherent need of hospitals to cultivate affiliated physicians limited the degree of administrative pressure that they were willing to exert.
D R G s as Management-control Systems
Advocates of D RGs believed that even if hospitals did not adopt casemix accounting and control systems on their own, the DRG reim bursement would finally provide the necessary economic stimulus. Administrators would be forced to examine utilization of services within their hospitals and to implement management-control systems similar to those employed by manufacturing firms. We found, however, that DRGs were not utilized in the average hospital as an integral part of its management-control system. It seems that there are far easier ways to save money. Indeed, the more financial pressure a hospital felt, the more likely it was to turn to traditional revenueenhancing and budget-cutting methods.
D RG proponents have argued, though, that the experience of the typical New Jersey hospital is not a fair test, as the financial constraints were not really onerous, and the D RG incentives were greatly watered down. Detailed interview information from specific New Jersey hospitals addresses the question of running a DRG-style internal-management system. Several of the suburban hospitals with reputations for aggressive management experimented with D RG data systems. The data gleaned from DRG accounting were discovered to be imprecise and often irrelevant to allocation decisions.
The administrators of these hospitals found the cost data attributed to each DRG to be particularly wanting. The D RG system, by linking costs to specific outputs, demands financial data far more precise than was ever collected before. But calculating the cost of every major activity in a hospital requires the use of accounting consultants and is very expensive. Most hospitals have been forced to rely on their existing charge schedules, developed for reimbursement rather than analysis purposes, as proxies for actual costs. When these schedules are examined closely, they invariably prove to be inaccurate.
The failure to take account of patient severity adequately within the DRG groups also limits their usefulness for management information (Horn and Sharkey 1983; Young and Saltman 1982) . DRG advocates have argued that severity should average out and not affect total reimbursement. But it does not average out within the hospital when individual physician profiles are created. Even if an entire year's data are accumulated, a few atypical cases can skew a physician's average. When these individual cases are eventually reviewed, the physician can contend that this information is not useful. At one suburban hospital, the senior, most respected surgeons appeared on the list of highest resource utilizers (i.e., greatest " money losers"). It turned out that there is an internal referral process, so that they receive the toughest, most costly cases.
Just which physician should be held responsible for costly cases remains unsettled within the system. The computer usually assigns patient costs to the admitting physician. But internists protest that when a patient is eventually transferred to surgery, the charges should also be transferred. The surgeons note that these same patients have longer lengths of stay because of the time before they reached surgery. Similar problems appear when tests or drugs were ordered by residents, rather than the admitting doctor. DRGs have trouble sorting out the shared-treatment responsibilities that are so common in hospitals.
Some administrators still compile and circulate D RG profiles to affiliated physicians. The language of business has been absorbed into the hospital culture, producing frequent reference to terms like strategic planning and cost control. But potential opposition from members of the medical staff leaves administrators unwilling to insist on the changes that the profiles or the terms might suggest (Young and Saltman 1982) . Even if D RG data were to improve significantly, it is highly unlikely that power relationships within hospitals would be altered. All organizations dependent on a single profession for the control of crucial uncertainties tread lightly on the authority of that profession (Sapolsky 1967; Rose 1972 ).
Conclusions
The use of DRG-based prospective reimbursement did not alter the management objectives and structure of New Jersey hospitals. Affiliated physicians were not required to change the core of their practice patterns significantly. Rather than challenging the prerogatives of physicians, New Jersey hospital administrators sought to preserve them. Administrators found that standard measures such as legislative lobbying, bargaining with regulators, better record keeping, and the development of new revenue sources were generally sufficient to protect the financial balances of their hospitals. Their strongest intervention was simply to reinforce a national trend toward lower lengths of stay and this was done without confronting physicians over detailed treatment regimens.
We believe that Medicare's DRG-reimbursement system will produce no different management effects even though the system varies con siderably in detail from that applied in New Jersey (Vladeck 1984) . The theory underlying DRG-induced efficiency assumes a greater restraint on hospital revenues than rate setting is likely to achieve. The con tradictory nature of health-system goals prevents the imposition of revenue levels that would force a realignment in hospital management. Although rate regulators may wish to encourage hospitals to become more cost conscious, they are fearful of adversely affecting access to care and the quality of medical treatment and, thus, are not willing to test the limits of their rate-setting powers.
Without the prospect of persistent deficits, hospitals lack the mo tivation to shift decision-making authority from physicians to ad ministrators. Hospital administrators themselves accept the current division of authority between financial and clinical affairs, considering it functional to patient-care objectives. Because hospitals are not profit maximizers, the opportunities to accumulate surpluses that DRG rates may offer are not sufficient to induce a search for clinical savings. Only the threat of financial failure can precipitate action and, even then, administrators are likely to explore fully routine methods for regaining solvency before considering clinical changes.
The reluctance to intervene in detailed treatment decisions is un derstandable. The care of individual patients is the domain of physicians who hold both legal and organizational responsibility for coping with the substantial uncertainties involved. In many instances, physicians are in disagreement about the value of particular therapies. When the path to efficacious care is unclear, so too is the path to efficient care.
DRG system designers saw a manufacturing analogy in hospitals where there is none. In only the limited statistical sense of their diagnosis categories do hospitals produce standardized products. The permutations of services available to hospital patients are large, with the selection of particular combinations left to the judgment of individual physicians. DRG reporting systems can detect differences in physicians' selection patterns, but offer only criteria for determining what is the average, not what is the best or most efficient pattern.
Prospective reimbursement arrangements are useful in highlighting a growing concern about the costs of hospital care and, if sufficiently stringent, may even constrain expenditures. Under both prospective systems-SHARE and DRGs-New Jersey's cost increases were some what below national averages. But in each system it was the overall budget cap of prospective rate setting that was the serious motivator for administrators. The expenditures constrained under a cap are more likely to be the ones traditionally controlled by administrators, not those controlled by physicians. The organizational structure carefully separates financial and clinical responsibilities in order to provide a stable, administratively protected environment for the uncertain practice of medicine. Until either the state of medical knowledge becomes much more certain than it is or the financing of hospital care much less certain than can be expected, this division of labor is likely to persist, DRG incentives notwithstanding.
Appendix: Data and Methods
The data for this study were gathered through two methods: statistical analysis and interviews. We conducted semistructured interviews with doctors, nurses, D RG coordinators, finance officers, and administrators at 16 New Jersey hospitals, distributed by size, geographic location, patient mix, ownership, and management reputation. We also in terviewed state and federal officials, insurers, local employers, and hospital and physician groups.
The statistical data were derived from the American Hospital As sociation surveys from 1972 to 1985 and the New Jersey State De partment of Health SHARE cost and utilization reports from 1979 to 1984. In addition, we performed analyses on a data file maintained by the New Jersey State Department of Health and formally known as the uniform bill-patient summary (UBPS). The annual reports collected by the American Hospital Association include information on hospital facilities, utilization, finances, and personnel. The New Jersey State Department of Health's SHARE reports are standardized accounts of financial performance and patient-volume data collected on an annual basis. The American Hospital Association and SHARE reports contain data for 93 of New Jersey's 97 acute-care hospitals and were audited in order to correct for reporting errors.
The UBPS data contain both clinical and billing information for each discharge and are used in New Jersey to assign patients to DRG payment categories. All UBPS records were included in the analysis with the exception of patients who left against medical advice and those who were transferred to other facilities. Data for 87 of the 93 New Jersey acute-care hospitals paid under DRGs were included in the UBPS sample and the hospitals selected had complete data for the study period.
Each UBPS patient record includes an account of hospital utilization by clinical service. Utilization is measured by charges, and services are grouped into clusters called cost centers. Hospital charges were transformed to costs using hospital-and cost-center-specific cost-tocharge ratios. In addition, all financial data were deflated to 1980 dollars using cost-center price indices from the New Jersey Department of Health.
Our analysis provides a detailed summary of costs and utilization under New Jersey's DRG-based payment system. Among the measures examined were percentage surplus of gross revenue, case volume for specific D RG s, an aggregate case-mix index, costs per capita, costs per case, nursing hours per day, and average length of stay. Data were also presented on changes in routine care, intensive care, and ancillary costs. In most of the analyses, we compared measures in the pre-DRG period with the same measures in the post-DRG period. When a pre-DRG measure was not available, we examined trends between 1981-one of the first years of D RG implementation-and 1984, the last year for which data were obtainable. In addition to making pre-and post-DRG comparisons, we contrasted data from New Jersey with regional and national trends.
There are several methodological limitations in evaluating the effects of DRGs on hospital costs and revenues in New Jersey. First, it is difficult to have valid pre-and post-DRG measures because the D RG system was implemented over a three-year period. Hospitals were not only entering the system at different times, but they also varied in the degree to which they anticipated and planned for the reimbursement changes. Thus, it is hard to separate completely the effects of the previous per diem regulation (SHARE) from DRGs. We primarily analyze, however, the multiyear impact from all SHARE to all D RG for financial shifts rather than year-by-year transitions. In another article we use statistical techniques that account precisely for when each hospital entered the system, and it does not produce significantly different conclusions (Hsiao and Dunn 1987) .
Second, by employing univariate statistical techniques, we were unable to control fully for all of the supply and demand factors that might confound our results. We tried, however, to be sensitive to the effects of changes in case mix, population, prices, case volume, and technology on our analyses. We also used our interview data as a check against our statistical findings. Moreover, our conclusion that rate setting has had only modest effects on hospital costs is consistent with past research (Eby and Cohodes 1985) .
A third limitation of the analysis is the use of costs or charges as a measure of service utilization. Costs-per-case trends can reflect both a change in the quantity of a clinical service provided per admission and a change in the service production function. Routine and intensive care unit days per case were presented in the results, but comparable measures of ancillary utilization were not available. Despite their imperfections, hospital charges or costs can serve as weights for the units of lab tests, radiological procedures, etc., and are the best proxy measure for ancillary resource use available for this study.
